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Taxation-DEDUCTIBILITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO SEGREGATED PRIVATE
ScHooLs-Green v. Kennedy
Brown v. Board of Education' set the stage for an extensive series of
activities designed to circumvent the Court's intention to abolish segre-
gated public education.2 However legally futile many of these endeavors
have become,8 there remains one instrument of education over which
the fourteenth amendment is powerless: the private school. Since tu-
ition alone inevitably fails to generate sufficient revenue to fund the
necessary expenses of construction and operation, private charitable
contributions are needed, and are encouraged by their deductibility for
federal income,4 as well as estate' and gift6 tax purposes.
Recently, the constitutionality of a tax-exempt status, necessary for
the deductibility of contributions, for the Mississippi private school
system was challenged. Since 1967, the Internal Revenue Service has
denied tax-exempt status to all schools which are affiliated with a
political subdivision to a degree found by the courts to constitute state
action.7 Green v. Kennedy8 enjoined the I.R.S. from granting exempt
status to private Mississippi schools established to avoid integration.
The court decided that the federal government was not constitutionally
free to frustrate, by a tax benefit to the schools and to the donors, the
only permissible state policy in favor of an integrated public school
system.9 This decision was predicated upon the finding that the state
had participated extensively in the establishment of the private system
of schools. To the Green court, this past state action rendered tax bene-
fits unconstitutional.
The state action concept extends the scope of the fourteenth amend-
ment to all activities, however private, in which the government is
significantly involved. This includes state, federal or local government
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2See generally Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Asst. Comm., 275 F. Supp. 833
(E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
3Id.
4 INT. REv. CODE; of 1954, § 170(c).
5 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2055 (a).
GINT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2522 (a).
7 Allen, The Tax-Exempt Status of Segregated Schools, 24 TAx. L. REv. 409, 413
(1969).
8 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
9 Id. at 1137.
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at all levels. The type of involvement necessary to invoke the amend-
ment was broadly stated shortly after its passage to include state action
of every kind which impairs the privileges or immunities of, or denies
to, any citizen due process and the equal protection of the -law.10 This
concept has been variously interpreted by the courts, to include the
operation of a private restaurant in a leased part of a public structure11
and the action of a state court in enforcing a private discriminatory
covenant in a deed,' as well as other activities connected to some level
of government by any tenuous link.?3 In these situations, however,
the state action which triggered the amendment was present action,
not past.14 The employment of past action as sufficient to invoke the
amendment results in unequal application when present action is miss-
ing.15 Yet absent some connection between the activity and the gov-
ernment, the fourteenth amendment does not apply.'6 Hence, it is
powerless to prohibit purely private discrimination.'7
The Green court's declaration of unconstitutionality of a tax ex-
emption poses an obvious threat to the future of privately endowed ed-
ucational institutions practicing racial segregation. Although it is un-
clear whether the Green decision turned on past state action, this is
10 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11 Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
12Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
13See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) "(operation of a park left in trust for the
use of white residents was within fourteenth amendment although conirolled by private
trustees); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964) (hospital accepting federal funds to aid- expansion);
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962) (sale of municipal
golf course to private party with reversion unless used for golfing rendered facility
subject to fourteenth amendment); Statom v. Board of Comm'rs., 233 Md. 57, 195 A.2d
41 (1963) (city furnished office space free to private boys' club and allowed members
access to school playgrounds for recreational purposes).
14 See cases cited note 13, supra.
15 Given two identical situations, one in which the state had been substantially
involved previously but had divorced itself prior to the commencement of the action
to invoke the amendment, and the other in which state action had never been present,
the Green rationale suggests application of the fourteenth amendment in the former,
but not the latter.
3O"[A]ction inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only
such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States." Shelley 'v. Iaemer, 334
U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
17 "[P]rvate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence fo the Equal
Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the state in any of its manifestations
has been found to have become involved in it." Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth.,
365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). -
180 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:157
immaterial to those educational institutions, located predominantly in
the South, where past state action preceded much of the presently pri-
vate activity.18 Green found an analogy between the often-litigated
state tuition grant practice," and the federal tax exemption, declaring
the difference to be solely one of degree.20 Although the tuition grant
practice in aid of segregation has been declared unconstitutional in
many of its myriad forms,2 a similar declaration of tax exemptions has
been rejected where tax benefits alone are urged to constitute state
action. 2- This is because such declaration would require the extension
of the fourteenth amendment to private individuals and possibly to
non-educational segregated institutions, including all charitable activity,
previously outside its scope.23
Implicit in the Green rationale is the influence of a public policy
opposed to educational segregation. If policy considerations are involved,
the court should not overlook the policy of encouraging charitable
activities through the stimulation of private benevolence, 4 which has
its roots extending deep into our legal system.2" The restriction of pri-
vate freedom to discriminate under the guise of unconstitutionality
18See generally Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Asst. Comm., 275 F. Supp. 833
(E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
19 See generally Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964); Griffin
v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969); Brown v. State Bd. of Educ.,
296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C. 1968), aff'd per curianz, 393 U.S. 222 (1968); Lee v. Macon
County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff'd sub nor. Wallace v.
United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
20 Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (D.D.C. 1970).
21 See cases cited note 19, supra.
22 "While a tax exemption, by itself, may not impose upon the recipient the
restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [iut may attain significance when
viewed in combination with other attendant state involvements." Eaton v. Grubbs,
329 F.2d 710, 713 (4th Cir. 1964).
23 "This court . . . is unable to hold that a simple tax benefit evokes state action.
Were that the law then every citizen of the United States and every legal creature
would be within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is not a scintilla
of legal precedent in that direction." Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F.
Supp. 674, 685 (E.D. La. 1962).
2 4 This policy is encouraged by the relief provided to the public treasury by private
contributions. See Milward v. Paschen, 16 ll.2d 302, 157 N.E.2d 1 (1959).
The exemption of income devoted to charity is due to public policy motives, and
should not be narrowly construed. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934).
25 Charitable trusts were accorded favorable treatment in England prior to the fif-
teenth century, and remain favored in the law. Vidal v. Girard's Exec's., 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 127 (1844); 2 A. Scorr, Sco-rr oN TRusrs, § 348.2 (3d ed. 1967).
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results in the impairment of freedom for all races,"8 and constitutes an
unwarranted deviation from judicial precedent. The doctrine of stare
decisis should not be abandoned for social expediency. Several hun-
dred years' experience indicates the value of charitable activities to
our society, whereas the value of educational racial integration is open
to serious doubt, and where an irrecondiliable conflict exists between
these two policies, integration must yield.
C.K.T.
26 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental theory
of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only."); Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955)
("The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the exercise of power by the
state or state agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of individuals").
"Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to use and
dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even
unjust in his personal relations are things all entitled to a large measure of protection
from governmental influence. This liberty would be overridden, in the name of
equality, if the structures of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were applied to govern-
mental and private action without distinction." Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250
(1963) (dissenting opinion).27 " Negro citizens ... are entitled to fair and impartial treatment. They are not
entitled to special treatment. To emasculate ancient rules which have guided the
Judiciary through its long history solely for the purpose of achieving a particular
result, is to set the judicial ship afloat in troublesome waters without chart, compass
or rudder." Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 331 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
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